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Abstract—The goal of this work is to systematically extract
information from hacker forums, whose information would be
in general described as unstructured: the text of a post is
not necessarily following any writing rules. By contrast, many
security initiatives and commercial entities are harnessing the
readily public information, but they seem to focus on structured
sources of information. Here, we focus on the problem of
identifying malicious IP addresses, among the IP addresses which
are reported in the forums. We develop a method to automate
the identification of malicious IP addresses with the design goal
of being independent of external sources. A key novelty is that we
use a matrix decomposition method to extract latent features of
the behavioral information of the users, which we combine with
textual information from the related posts. A key design feature
of our technique is that it can be readily applied to different
language forums, since it does not require a sophisticated Natural
Language Processing approach. In particular, our solution only
needs a small number of keywords in the new language plus the
user’s behavior captured by specific features. We also develop a
tool to automate the data collection from security forums. Using
our tool, we collect approximately 600K posts from 3 different
forums. Our method exhibits high classification accuracy, while
the precision of identifying malicious IP in post is greater
than 88% in all three forums. We argue that our method
can provide singificantly more information: we find up to 3
times more potentially malicious IP address compared to the
reference blacklist VirusTotal. As the cyber-wars are becoming
more intense, having early accesses to useful information becomes
more imperative to remove the hackers first-move advantage, and
our work is a solid step towards this direction.
Keywords: Security, Online communities mining, Fo-
rums
I. INTRODUCTION
How can we take the first-mover advantage away from
hackers? We argue that hacker forums provide information
earlier than other sources, and we should leverage these forums
in our security intelligence. Here, we focus on a specific
question. In particular, we want to extract as much useful
information from hacker/security forums as possible in order
to perform (possibly early) detection of malicious IP addresses,
e.g., prior to their appearance on blacklists. The latter can
exhibit large delays in their update and hence, new ways
for labeling malicious IP addresses are needed [15]. In this
study we will use the term “hacker forums” to describe online
forums with a focus on security and system administration.
Interestingly, we can classify these forums into categories: (a)
main stream forums, like Wilders Security, and (b) “fringe”
forums, like Offensive Community, where we find users with
names like satan911. Some of these forums have been known
to have hackers boast of attacks they have mounted, or sell
tools for malicious purposes (think rent-a-botnet). For example,
in our dataset there is a post that mentions “I give you a
second server to have your fun with. Multiple websites on
this server. So let’s see if anyone can actually bring down the
server”. Right after that the hacker posted the IP, username
and password for anyone to access the server. In fact, there
is a show-off section in these forums for people to broadcast
their hacking “skills”.
The overarching goal of this work is to mine the unstruc-
tured, user-generated content in security forums. Specifically,
we focus here on collecting malicious IP addresses, which
are often reported at such forums. We use the term security
forum to refer to discussion forum with a focus on security,
system administration, and or more generally, systems-related
discussions. The users in these forums include: security pro-
fessionals, hobbyists, and hackers, who go on these forums
to identify issues, discuss solutions, and in general exchange
information.
Let us provide a few examples of how users report IP
addresses, which may or may not be malicious. Posts could
talk about a benign IP address, say in configuration files, as
in the post:
"[T]his thing in my hosts file: 64.91.255.87 ... [is] it
correct?".
At the same time, posts could also report compromised or
malicious IP addresses, as in the post:
"My browser homepage has been hijacked to
http://69.50.191.51/2484/".
The challenge is to automatically distinguish between the
two. By doing so, we can provide a new source of information
of malicious IP addresses directly from the affected individu-
als. Formally, we can state the problem as follows:
Key Question: Malicious IP Detection. Given a set of
posts PF that may contain IP addresses and users UF of a
security forum F , as well as, the features Φp, ∀p ∈ PF and
Φu, ∀u ∈ UF for the posts and the users respectively, can we
determine if a given IP address i is malicious or not?
The set of features PF includes attributes such as the text
of the post, the posting user, the time of post, etc., while UF
includes information such as the date of a user joining the
forum, the number of posts the user has made etc. The above
problem has two associated questions:
a. Exclusivity: How many IP Addresses can we find that
are never reported by other reference sources?
b. Early warning: How much earlier are malicious IP
Addresses reported in a forum compared to reference sources,
for the IP Addresses reported by both?
Most previous studies in this area have focused on struc-
tured information sources, such as security reports, or malware
databases. In fact, many efforts focus on addressing security
problems using knowledge obtained from the web, as well
as social and information networks. These efforts are mainly
focused on analyzing structured sources (e.g., [16]). However,
studies assessing the usefulness of (unstructured) information
in online forums have only recently emerged (e.g., [23]). These
studies are rather exploratory and provide evidence of the
usefulness of the data in the forums, but do not provide a
systematic methodology or ready-to-use tools, which is the
goal of our work. We discuss existing literature in more detail
later in section V.
The motivation of our work is to provide more information
to security analysts and systems. We want to enhance and
complement, but not replace, existing efforts for detecting
malicious IP Addresses. For instance, many IP blacklists enlist
an IP as malicious after a number of reports above a pre-
defined threshold have been made for the specific address.
Depending on the threshold and the reactivity of the affected
users/systems, this might take several days, weeks or months.
Therefore, a system, like the one proposed here, can identify
and point to malicious IP address to blacklist services and
firewalls.
We propose InferIP, a systematic approach for identifying
malicious IP Addresses among the IP addresses, which are
mentioned in security forums. A key novelty is that we use the
behavioral information of the users, in addition to the textual
information from the related posts. Specifically, we customize
and use a Sparse Matrix Regression method on this expanded
set of features.
This paper presents an extension of our previous work [14].
Here, we add some spatiotempral and behavioral analysis to
extract the characteristics of the identified IP addresses and the
users who used these IP address in their posts. Moreover, we
investigate the ability of the proposed method to provide early
warning regarding malicious IP addresses.
By design, our framework is applicable to forums in
different languages as it relies only on the behavioral patterns
of users and simple word counts, and not a complex language-
specific Natural Language Processing technique. From a tech-
nical point of view the challenge in designing a solution
to our Key Question is most IP Addresses mentioned in
these forums are not malicious. We show that our system
can add a significant number of previously unreported IP
address to existing blacklist services. Finally, as an engineering
contribution, we develop a customizable tool to facilitate the
crawling of forums, which we discuss in the next section.
Our results can be summarized into the following points:
a. Our method exhibits precision and recall greater
than 88% and 85% respectively, and an accuracy over
malicious class above 86% in the 10-fold cross validation
tests we conducted for the three different forums. In partially
answering our Key Question, if our method labels a currently
non-blacklisted IP as malicious, there is a high chance that it
is malicious, given our high precision.
b. Our method identifies three times more malicious IP
Addresses compared to VirusTotal [5] a widely used aggrega-
tor of 60 blacklists of IP addresses. Across our three forums,
we find more than 2000 potential malicious IP Addresses that
were never reported by VirusTotal.
c. Our method identifies more than half of the IP
addresses at least 3 month earlier than VirusTotal. We
study the malicious IP addresses that are identified by both
VirusTotal and InferIP. We find 53%, 71% and 62% of these
IP addreses in Wilders Security, Offensive Community and
Ashiyane respectively at least 3 months earlier than they were
reported in VirusTotal.
d. The number of reported malicious IP addresses has
increased by a factor 8 in 4 years.We find that the number of
malicious IP addresses has increased from roughly 100 in 2011
and 2012 to more than 800 in 2016. This could be attributed to
either an increase in the user base, an increase in the number
of attacks, or a combination of the two.
II. DATA COLLECTION AND BASIC PROPERTIES
We have collected data from three different forums relevant
to our study; (i) Wilders Security [6], (ii) Offensive Commu-
nity [4], (iii) Ashiyane [1]. The first two forums are mainly
written in English, while the last forum is an Iranian forum,
in Farsi1.
Our data collection tool. We develop a customizable uni-
versal tool to make the crawling forums easier. The challenge
here is that each forum has its own format and layout. Our
tool requires only a custom configuration file, before crawling
a new forum. In configuration file, we specify entities in the
forum which are needed such as user ID, post’s date, post’s
content and etc by XML Path Language known as Xpath.
Leveraging our current configuration files, the task of crawling
a new forum is simplified significantly. Using our crawler, we
collect data from three forums, two English and one in Farsi
for a total number of more than 30K users and 600K posts.
We use VirusTotal [5] as our reference blacklist IP ad-
dresses, since it is an aggregator, and combines the information
from over 70 other blacklists and resources. VirusTotal is
free to end users for non-commercial use and is a private
API to query the services in the rate of more than 4000
IP addresses per minutes. It is provided upon requests for
academic purposes.
We provide some basic statistics for our three forums in
Table II. Offensive Community and Ashiyane are two fringe
forums in different languages. In these forums there is a section
where people openly boast about their achievement in hacking.
They share their ideas and tutorials on how to break into
1Our software and datasets will be made available at:
https://github.com/hackerchater/
TABLE I: Extracting useful information; Number of malicious IP Addresses found by InferIP and not by VirusTotal.
IP found by
Dataset Total IP Virus Total InferIP only
Wilders Security 4338 216 670
Offensive Community 7850 339 617
Ashiyane 8121 133 806
vulnerable networks. On the other hand, Wilders Security as a
mainstream forum is mostly used to protect non-experts against
attacks such as browser hijacking, and provide solutions for
their security problems.
For completeness, we present some of the terms we use
here. A user is defined by a login name registered with the
site. The term post refers to a single unit of content generated
by a user. A thread refers to a collection of posts that are
replies to a given initiating post.
In Figures 1 and 2, we present the cumulative complemen-
tary distribution function of the number of posts per user and
the number of threads per users respectively. As we can see in
all the cases the distributions are skewed, that is, most of the
users contribute few posts in the forums and engage with few
threads. In Wilders Security, 85% of users post less than 10
posts each, while 5.2% of the users post more than 50 posts.
We find that 70% of the users post in only one thread and
only 8% of the users are active in more than 10 threads. This
skewed behavior is typical for online users and communities
[12]. We will use features to capture aspects of both these user
properties, as we will see in the next section.
In Figure 3, we present the cumulative complementary
distribution function of the number of IP addresses that appear
in each post. The skewed distribution shows that most of
the posts contain a few number of IP address. We find that
84.2% of the posts with IP addresses in Wilders Security and
84.1% in Offensive Community have two or less IP addresses.
In Ashiyane, 87.2% of these posts contain less than two
IP addresses. Interestingly, in Ashiyane, we find 1% of the
IP containing posts with more than 100 IP addresses. We
investigated and we found that typically, these posts provide
benign IP addresses of proxies servers to fellow administrators.
Groundtruth for training and testing. In order to build
and evaluate, our model we need to obtain a reasonably labeled
dataset from IP addresses that appear in the posts of the
security forums. For that, we use the VirusTotal service and
assign malicious labels to an IP that has been reported by this
service. The number of malicious IP Addresses that we have
used with the corresponding posts are shown in table I as the
IP found by VirusTotal. Note that the absence of a report on
VirusTotal does not necessarily mean that the IP is benign.
However, a listed IP address is most likely malicious, since
VirusTotal as most blacklist sites require a high threshold of
confidence for blacklisting an address. This way, we find in
total 688 malicious IP addresses for our forums as shown in
Table I.
Using this labeling process we have collected all the IP
addresses that have appeared on our forums prior to their report
on VirusTotal. For building our model, we also randomly select
an equal number of IP addresses that have not been reported as
malicious and via manual inspection further assess their status.
Finally, for every security forum we have a different dataset
and hence, we build a different model.
III. INFERIP: MALICIOUS IP DETECTION
We propose a method to identify whether an IP address
within a post is malicious. For example, although many users
report a malicious IP address, such as one that is attacking the
user’s network, there are also users that will mention a benign
IP address when people discuss about network tutorials like
setting up Putty or initiating a SSH connection.
While this task is simple for a human, it is non-trivial to
automate. Adding to the challenge, different communities use
different terminology and even different languages altogether
(english and farsi in our case). In order to overcome these
challenges, we use a diverse set of features and build a model
to identify IP addresses that are potentially malicious.
Our approach consists of four steps that each hide non-
trivial novelties:
Step 1: We consider the user behavior and extract features
that profile users that post IP-reporting posts.
Step 2: We extract keywords from the posts and use
information gain to identify the 100 most informative features.
Step 3: We identify meaningful latent feature sets using
an unsupervised co-clustering approach [19].
Step 4: We train a classifier using these latent feature sets
using 10-fold cross validation.
We describe each step in more detail.
Step 1: Behavioral Features. We associate each user of
the forum with a set of 11 features that capture their behavior.
In particular:
• Number of posts; the total number of posts made by
the user
• Number of threads; the total number of threads the
user has contributed to
• Number of threads initiated; the total number of
threads initiated by the user
• Average thread entropy; the average entropy of the
user distribution of the threads in which the user has
contributed to
• Number of active days; the number of days that the
user generates at least one post
TABLE II: The collected forums.
Forum Threads Posts Users Active days
Wilders Security 28661 302710 14836 5227
Offensive Comm. 3542 25538 5549 1508
Ashiyane 67004 279309 22698 4978
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Fig. 1: CCDF of the number of posts per user (log-log scale).
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Fig. 2: CCDF of the number of thread per user (log-log scale).
100 101 102
10−2
10−1
100
101
102
Number of IPs
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f p
os
ts
(a) Wilders Security
100 101 102
100
101
102
Number of IPs
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f p
os
ts
(b) Offensive Community
100 101 102 103
10−2
10−1
100
101
102
Number of IPs
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f p
os
ts
(c) Ashiyane
Fig. 3: CCDF of the number of IP addresses per post (log-log scale).
• Average day entropy; the average entropy of the user
distribution of the posts made on the days that the user
is active
• Active lifetime; the number of days between the first
and the last post of the user
• Wait time; the number of days passed between the
day the user joined the forum and the day the user
contributed their first post
• Average post length; the average number of characters
in the user’s posts
• Median post length; the median number of characters
in the user’s posts
• Maximum post length; the number of character’s in
the user’s longest post
Step 2: Contextual Features. Apart from the aforemen-
tioned behavioral features we also include features related with
the context in which an IP address appears within a post. In
particular, we consider the frequency of the words (except
stop-words) in the posts. Words that are frequent only in few
documents (posts in our case) are more informative than those
that appear frequently on a larger corpus [21]. To this end, we
use TF-IDF to weight the various words/terms that appear in
our data. After calculating the frequency and the corresponding
weights of each word in the dataset we end up with more
than 10,000 features/terms. Hence, in the next step we select
discriminative features by extracting latent features.
We begin by performing feature selection in order to iden-
tify the most informative features by applying the information
gain framework [25]. Furthermore, in order to avoid overfitting
we pick a random subset of posts from the whole dataset and
select the highest ranked features based on Information Gain
score. In this way, a subset of discriminative keywords, 100 in
our model, are selected. It turns out that each user uses only
a small number of those words, resulting in a sparse dataset
which we wish to exploit in our model.
Step 3: Identifying latent feature sets. We also like to
leverage latent similarities of different posts in some of the di-
mensions spanned by post features and behavioral features for
the writer of the post. Essentially, we seek to identify groups of
highly similar posts under a small number of features, which
does not necessarily span the full set of features. The reason
why we wish to pinpoint a subset of the features instead of
the entire set is because this way we are able to detect subtle
patterns that may go undetected if we require post similarity
across all the features. We call those sets of feastures latent
feature sets . To this end, we apply a soft co-clustering method,
Sparse Matrix Regression (SMR) [19], to exploit the sparsity
and extract latent features of the post containing IP addresses.
Given a matrix X of posts × features, its soft co-clustering
via SMR can be posed as the following optimization problem:
minar≥0,br≥0 ‖X−
∑R
r arb
T
r ‖
2
F + λ
∑
i,r |ar(i)|+
λ
∑
j,r |br(j)|
where ar and br are vectors that “describe” co-cluster r,
which we explain below. Each ar is a vector with as many
dimensions as posts. Each value ar(i) expresses whether post
i is affiliated with co-cluster r. Similarly, br is a vector with
as many dimensions as features, and br(j) expresses whether
feature j is affiliated with with co-cluster r. Parameter λ
controls how sparse the co-cluster assignments are, effectively
controlling the co-cluster size. As we increase λ we get sparser
results, hence cleaner co-clustering assignments. We tune λ
via trial-and-error so that we obtain clean but non-empty co-
clusters, and we select λ = 0.01 in our case.
Step 4: Training the model. We subsequently train a
number of classifiers using the selected features based on a
matrix. In particular, we examine (a) a Naive Bayes classifier,
(b) a K-Nearest Neighbor classifier and (c) a logistic regression
classifier. Our 10-fold cross validation indicates that the Lo-
gistic regression classifier outperforms kNN and Naive Bayse,
achieving high accuracy, precision and recall (see Table III).
Determining feature sets. We investigate the effect of
selecting different feature sets in classifying IP addresses in
forums. To this end, we investigate three subsets of the features
discussed earlier.
a. Words-Frequency is the normalized frequency of the
most informative words that appear in a post as discussed in
Step 2.
b. Combined is the set of features which consists of the
combination of the words frequency features, defined above,
and user behaviour features, which are extracted in Step 1. In
other words, it is the union of the features in Step 1 and Step
2.
c. Co-Clustered is the latent set of features extracted
in Step 3 by applying the co-clustering approach on the
Combined features set.
We evaluate these three sets of features on their ability to
enable the classification. In more detail, we use these features
with a classifier to assess their effectiveness by computing the
accuracy of the classifier to identify malicious IP addresses.
According to the results which are shown in Figure 4, the
Co-Clustered features set exhibits higher accuracy by 4.1%
compared to Words-Frequency. On the other hand, although
the Combined features do not increase the accuracy compared
to the Words-Frequency, the co-clustering method does. It
extracts the latent features from the Combined features set and
outperforms Words-Frequency and Combined in identifying
malicious IP addresses.
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Fig. 4: Accuracy of different feature sets in Wilders Security forum
to detect malicious IP
A. Applying InferIP on the forums
Having established the statistical confidence of our classi-
fier, we apply it on the posts of the forums except the ones
that we used in our groundtruth. We use the logistic regression
classifier as it exhibits the best performance.
Applying InferIP on the forums shows that there is a wealth
of information that we can extract from security forums in
two aspects of the quantity and time of detecting malicious IP
against VirusTotal.
a. Detecting more IP addresses. With InferIP, we find an
additional 670 malicious IP addresses in Wilders Security, and
TABLE III: Selecting a classifier: overall accuracy.
Forum Naive Bayes 3NN Logistic regression
Wilders Security 91.9% 87.1 % 94.8%
Offensive Comm. 84.1% 83.2% 86.5%
Ashiyane 85.1% 82.3% 94%
TABLE IV: InferIP evaluation: 10-fold cross validation evaluation (using Logistic Regression).
Forum Instances Precision Recall ROC Area
Wilders Security 362 0.9 0.94 0.96
Offensive Comm. 342 0.88 0.85 0.91
Ashiyane 446 0.9 0.92 0.92
617 in Offensive Community 806 in Ashiyane (see Table I). In
other words, InferIP enables us to find three times additional
malicious IP addresses in total compared to the IP addresses
found on VirusTotal. It is interesting to observe that this
factor varies among our three sites. For Ashiyane, our method
finds roughly 6 times additional malicious IP addresses. With
a precision of roughly around 90% and considering small
amount of False Positive rate, our method can add a significant
number of malicious IP addresses to a blacklist. Using the
limited manual inspection, we confirm that the precision of
the method on out of sample data is in the order of 88%.
b. Detecting malicious IP addresses earlier: more than
half IPs, at least 3 months earlier Here we focus on the
malicious IP addresses that are jointly identified by our method
and VirusTotal and compare the time that they were reported
in each source, and show the results in Table V for 3, 6 and
12 months difference in time. We compare jointly detected IP
addresses with InferIP and VirusTotal in terms of time that the
IP addresses were mentioned in posts and the time they were
reported on VirusTotal. We see that on average 62% of the
malicious IP addresses with InferIP could be identified at least
3 months earlier than VirusTotal. We can see that with InferIP,
we find 53%, 71% and 62% of these IP addresses in Wilders
Security, Offensive Community and Ashiyane respectively at
least 3 months earlier than in VirusTotal. We also identify 39%
and 24% of the malicious IP addresses respectively at least 6
and 12 months earlier with InferIP.
Additional stress-testing of our accuracy: In order to
assess the performance of our approach, we randomly picked
10 percent of the labeled data with InferIP method and
annotated them manually by human annotators. The calculated
accuracy on the sampled data shows more than 85% accuracy
on average over all datasets which is close but somewhat lower
than the reported accuracy in the Table III.
Contributing Users. Who are the users that report ma-
licious IP addresses? We want to understand and ideally,
develop a profile for these users, which we will refer to as
Contributing users. We start by considering the number of
post these users post on the forums.
The majority of IP reporting is done by highly active
(more than 10 posts overall) in Ashiyane. In Figure 5,
we show the cumulative complementary distribution function
for the number of posts per Contributing user for Ashiyane.
TABLE V: Timely comparison between jointly detected malicious IP
addresses in InferIP and VirusTotal. Reported percentage of malicious
IP Addresses which InferIP detected earlier than VirusTotal
At least X months earlier
Dataset 3 6 12
Wilders Security 53% 23% 14%
Offensive Community 71% 46% 21%
Ashiyane 62% 49% 37%
Average (across forums) 62% 39% 24%
More than 72% of the Contributing users post more than 10
posts overall, which we consider as high engagement given
the distribution of posting that we saw in the previous section.
Therefore, in Ashiyane, Contributing users are contributing
significantly in reporting malicious IP addresses. Intrigued, we
examined further and found that, among them, there are two
users who have more than 1000 posts, 1058 and 2780 to be
exact, and whose user-names are "Classic" and "Crisis". On
the other side of the spectrum, 2.4% of Contributing users have
posted a single post in the forum, and in that post they reported
a malicious IP address.
The majority of IP reporting is done by less active users
(less than 10 posts overall) in Offensive Community. In
Figure 5, we show the cumulative complementary distribution
function for the number of posts per Contributing user for
Offensive Community. Unlike Ashiyane, here 65% of the
Contributing users have less than 10 posts overall. Going into
more detail, roughly 12% of the Contributing users have a
single post overall, while 26% of them have only two overall
posts. The same behavior is observed in Wilders Security
which is shown in Figure 5.
Overall, there does not seem to be an obvious pattern
between number of total posts and number of malicious IPs
reported among Contributing users.
B. Case-study: from reported malicious IPs to a DDoS attack
We show that mining the forums could actually provide
information about real events. We identify a link between a
malicious IP address that our method detected with an actual
DDoS attack.
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Fig. 5: CCDF of the number of overall posts per Contributing users (who report malicious IPs) in log-log scale.
We conducted the following analysis. We plot the time-
series of the number of posts containing malicious IP addresses
in Wilders Security from 2012 to 2013 found by InferIP. We
show the time-series in Figure 6. We observe some spikes on
these time-series, which we further analyze. One of the spikes
was in September 2012, and it reports a set of malicious IP
addresses that were involved in an DDoS attack that month.
That same thread continued being active, and in December of
2012, it was reported in that thread that attack was caused by
Nitol Botnet due to a Microsoft’s vulnerability [3].
We argue that this case-study points to additional layers
of functionality that can be built upon our method, that can
provide a semi-automated way to extract richer information
beyond just reporting malicious IP addresses.
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Fig. 6: Time-series of the number of posts containing malicious IP
reported in each month for Wilders Security.
C. Discussion and limitations
Although our method exhibits pretty good accuracy overall,
we attempt to understand its limitations and detect the source
of misclassifications.
Limited text in the post: The words in the post provide
significant evidence for the classification. In some cases, some
posts are very sparse in their text, which makes the classifi-
cation of the included IP address harder. We consider these
kinds of posts a significant contributor to misclassifications.
Characterization at the post level: In our method, we
classify an IP address by using features at the level of a post.
Recall that roughly 86% of all posts across all forums has
a single IP per post as shown in Figure 3. In other words,
having more than one IP address per post is already not very
common. Furthermore, even more rarely, we have seen a few
cases, where a post contains both a benign and a malicious
IP address. As our method is currently set-up, this will lead
to errors in the classification. A straightforward solution is to
consider examining the text surrounding each IP address within
the post.
IV. SPATIOTEMPORAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the spatiotemporal features of
the malicious IP addresses identified in security forums in
Section III.
A. Temporal analysis
The key question from a temporal point of view is if
the number of reported malicious IP addresses increases or
decreases over time.
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Fig. 7: Increasing trend: Malicious IP addresses reported on the
forums each year.
The number of reported malicious IP addresses has
increased by a factor 8 in 4 four years. In Figure 7, we plot
the number of reported malicious IPs found by our method
across all three forums between 2011-2016. We find that the
number increased by a factor of 8: from roughly 100 to roughly
800. In spite of some decreases in years 2011, 2012 and 2015,
it has a clear increasing trend.
B. Spatial analysis
We study the geo-location of the identified IP addresses
from Section III. We utilize GeoLite database [2], which can
show us the country and continent of an IP address. Here we
focus on continents of the IP addresses location.
A natural question to ask is whether the geographical dis-
tribution of the malicious addresses differs between VirusTotal
and InferIP. We investigate this in detail below.
VirusTotal: North America hosts the majority of the
reported malicious IP addresses. We plot the percentage
of the distribution of the IP addresses extracted from Virus-
Total across continents in Figure 8 (a) between 2011-2016.
We observe that the majority of the malicious IP addresses
are located in the North America continent. There are two
exception in 2013 and 2016 when Asia and Europe respectively
contain most of the malicious IP addresses. Overall, Table VI
shows the geo-graphical distribution over all the years: North
America, Asia and Europe are the three most active continents
in that order.
InferIP: North America dominates again, but South
America and Africa have non-trivial contributions.We plot
the percentage of the distribution of the IP addresses extracted
form InferIP across continents in Figure 8 (b) between 2011-
2016. We observe that North America hosts the majority of
the reported malicious IP addresses again, but we find a
more diverse global activity compared to what we observed
in VirusTotal. For example, we can see that in years 2013,
2014, and 2016: (a) Asia has the majority of the malicious IP
addresses, and (b) South America and Africa have a consid-
erable percentage of malicious IP addresses. However, when
seen across all years, the geographical distributions of the IPs
in InferIP and VirusTotal quite similar: North America, Asia
and Europe have the majority of the malicious IPs detected by
InferIP similarly to those of VirusTotal. In Figure 9, we plot
the geographical distribution of malicious IPs per continent
across all years and all forums for InferIP and VirusTotal,
while the exact numbers are shown in Table VI. Qualitatively
the distributions look relatively similar, especially in the order
of significance of the continents, but at the same, we can see
that South America and Africa have a larger percentage of IP
addresses in InferIP compared to those in VirusTotal.
V. RELATED WORK
We briefly discuss three categories of relevant research.
a. Analyzing structured security sources. There is a long
line of research studying the ontology of cyber security and the
automatic extraction of information from structured security
documents. Iannacone et al.[16] developed a schema for ex-
tracting relevant concepts from various types of structured data
sources. In another work, Blanco et al. [9] proposed methods
to detect anomalies on the extracted ontology and network
flow graph. Moreover, Bridges et al.[10] proposed a method
to do entity labeling on structured data by utilizing neural
networks. These work are complementary to ours as we focus
on unstructured data, which poses different challenges.
b. Analyzing online security forums. Recently security
forums have been the focus of various studies that showcase
the usefulness of the information present in security forums.
For example, Motoyama et al. [18] present a comprehensive
statistical analysis in underground forums. Others studies focus
on the users’ classification or the discovery of the relationships
between the forum’s members [26], [7]. Extracting different
discussion topic in the forums and classifying the language of
the codes posted in the forum has been done in [23]. Contrary
to these studies, our work emphasizes on the development of
automated systems that actually exploit the wealth of infor-
mation in these security forums in order to enhance security.
Similar to detecting malicious users on commenting platforms
has been done on [17]. A recent work analyzes security forums
to identify and geo-locate Canadian IP addresses focusing on
spam and phishing [13] and in another work, Portnoff et al.
[20] studies the exchange of malicious services and tools and
studies their prices on the security forums.
c. Analyzing blogs and social networks. There has been
a plethora of studies on blogs and social media, but their goals
are typical not related to extracting security information. [11],
[8], [24]. The studies range from modeling user behavior [12],
[22] to inferring information about the user (demographics,
preferences, mental state), and to modeling the information
propagation on online forums. Although interesting, the focus
of these studies are significantly different from our goal here.
VI. CONCLUSION
The take away message from our work is that there seems
to be a wealth of useful information in security forums. The
challenge is that the information is unstructured and we need
novel methods to extract it. In this direction, a key insight of
our work is that using behavioral and text-based features can
provide promising results.
In support of this assertion, we develop a systematic
method to extract malicious IP addresses reported in security
forums. We utilize both behavioral, as well as textual features
and show that we can detect malicious IP addresses with
high accuracy, precision and recall. Our results in Table I are
promising.
We then apply InferIP to all the posts we have collected.
Although are classification is not perfect, our relatively high
precision (hovering around 90% in Table IV) provides suffi-
cient confidence in our results. We find three times as many
additional malicious IP addresses as the original malicious
IP addresses identified by VirusTotal. Furthermore, even for
the jointly discovered IP addresses, at least 53% of the IP
addresses detected at least 3 months earlier than VirusTotal.
The key message from our spatiotemporal analysis is that the
number of reported malicious IP addresses is increasing over
time.
In the future, we plan to extend our work by extracting
other types of security information. Our first goal is to detect
malicious URLs mentioned in the forums. Our second and
more ambitious goal is to identify the emergence of new
malware, threats, and possibly attacks, which we expect to
see associated with large numbers of panic-filled or help-
requesting posts. Our final goal is to identify malicious users,
since interestingly, some users seem to be promoting and
selling hacking tools in these forums.
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Fig. 8: SpatioTemporal distribution of malicious IP addresses detected by InferIP and VT .
TABLE VI: Percentage of distribution of IP addresses across continents over all the years.
North America Asia Europe South America Africa Oceania
InferIP 46.7 32.5 13.5 5.2 1.6 0.5
VirusTotal 50 26.5 20.4 2.4 0.6 0.17
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Fig. 9: The percentage distribution of malicious IP Addresses in each
continent across all three forums for InferIP and VirusTotal.
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